Unit Bitcoin (UBTC)

Contract Addresses

HyperEVM Contracts

Contract	Address	Type
UBTC Token	0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463	UUPS Proxy (ERC-20)
UBTC Implementation	0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc	Implementation
HyperEVM Deployer (Owner)	0xB4FC973924a91362D301E583E839Cdaf4f19cdF8	EOA (MPC-controlled per docs)

Treasury Addresses

Native Chain	Treasury Address	HyperCore Treasury
Bitcoin	bc1pdwu79dady576y3fupmm82m3g7p2p9f6hgyeqy0tdg7ztxg7xrayqlkl8j9	0x574bAFCe69d9411f662a433896e74e4F153096FA
Ethereum	0xBEa9f7FD27f4EE20066F18DEF0bc586eC221055A	0x8DAfBe89302656a7Df43c470e9EbCB4c540835c0

Guardian Public Keys

Per the key addresses docs (last updated ~May 2026), three Guardian nodes attest to deposit/withdrawal address generation:

Guardian Name	Public Key (identifier)
unit-node	Unit Protocol
hl-node	Hyperliquid
field-node	Infinite Field

Guardian composition unchanged since protocol launch. The public keys can be used to independently verify address generation integrity.

HyperCore Token Deployer

The HyperCore deployer is a multi-sig user at address 0xF036a5261406a394bd63Eb4dF49C464634a66155 (per docs, deployed via HIP-1 native token standard).

How Unit Protocol Works (Context)

Unit is a bridge/asset tokenization protocol — not a lending, staking, or yield protocol.

Deposit flow:

1. User connects Hyperliquid wallet and selects BTC
2. Unit's Guardian Network generates a unique Bitcoin deposit address (MPC-derived, permanently tied to user's Hyperliquid address)
3. User sends BTC to this address
4. After 2 block confirmations on Bitcoin, Guardians verify and co-sign a transaction to credit UBTC on Hyperliquid

Withdrawal flow:

1. User enters destination Bitcoin address and amount
2. Unit generates a unique withdrawal address on Hyperliquid
3. User signs the transaction
4. Upon Hyperliquid finalization (~10 seconds), Guardians process the Bitcoin transfer
5. Withdrawals are batched — BTC withdrawals process every ~3 Bitcoin blocks, ETH every ~21 slots

Fees: Unit does not collect revenue from deposits or withdrawals. The only fees are native network transaction fees.

Required confirmations:

Chain	Confirmations	Time
Bitcoin	2+	≥20 minutes
Hyperliquid	2,000	~3.5 minutes
Ethereum	14	~3 minutes

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

No smart contract audits are publicly disclosed or listed. Status re-confirmed July 1, 2026.

• DeFiLlama protocol record still reports audits: 0 and audit_links: null for Unit (verified via /protocol/unit API).
• No audit reports or links are found in the Unit documentation (docs.hyperunit.xyz — searched for audit / bug bounty / Immunefi / Sherlock / Cantina / OpenZeppelin / Trail of Bits / Halborn / ChainSecurity: no matches).
• No audit page exists on the Unit website or docs.
• The architecture/security docs page covers MPC, secure enclaves, and state machine design but makes no reference to third-party audits.
• HyperEVMScan still shows no security audit submitted for the UBTC token contract.
• Multiple independent third-party analyses (ASXN, Impossible Finance, blocmates, ChainCatcher) confirm no audits exist.

Bug Bounty

• No bug bounty program found on Immunefi (both /bounty/unit/ and /bounty/hyperunit/ return 404), Sherlock, or Cantina.
• Unit Protocol is not registered on Safe Harbor (SEAL).

Source Code

• Proxy contract (0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463) is source-code verified on HyperEVMScan — ERC1967Proxy (Solidity v0.8.24, MIT). Re-verified July 1, 2026 via Etherscan V2 multi-chain API (chainId=999): ContractName=ERC1967Proxy, Proxy=1, Implementation=0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc.
• Implementation contract (0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc) is STILL NOT source-code verified — the actual token logic remains opaque. Etherscan V2 API returns empty ContractName and SourceCode (verified July 1, 2026).
• Selector + string extraction from the bytecode confirms a USDT-style sender blacklist plus a separate compliance-authority role layered on top of OZ ERC20Upgradeable + OwnableUpgradeable + UUPSUpgradeable. See Appendix: Implementation Surface (bytecode-derived) for the full selector list and verification commands.
• No public GitHub repository found for Unit Protocol smart contracts (DeFiLlama lists no GitHub).
• Implementation bytecode is 11,660 bytes. Proxy bytecode is 163 bytes (minimal ERC-1967 proxy).

Historical Track Record

• DeFiLlama listing date: February 14, 2025 (~16 months at reassessment date).
• Current protocol TVL: ~$418M (July 1, 2026) — Bitcoin $258M, Ethereum $85M, Solana $57M, Plasma $12M, Monad $3M (per DeFiLlama). Roughly flat since prior assessment (~$414M).
• Peak TVL: ~$1.48B (October 8, 2025).
• TVL trend: ~28% of ATH; flat over the past 6 weeks (30-day range $405M–$449M).

CoinGecko market data (UBTC, July 1, 2026):

Metric	Value
Price	~$58,650
Market Cap	~$192.2M
24h Volume	~$38.4M
Circulating Supply	~3,272.76 UBTC
Total Supply (cap)	21,000,000 UBTC
ATH	$126,087 (Oct 6, 2025)
ATL	$58,003 (Jun 25, 2026)
30-day Price Change	−19.3%

Onchain supply (verified July 1, 2026):

• totalSupply() on UBTC proxy returns 2,100,000,000,000,000 (8 decimals) → 21,000,000 UBTC (Bitcoin hard cap; unchanged).
• Circulating supply per CoinGecko: ~3,272.76 UBTC — most of the 21M cap is uncirculated.
• Bitcoin treasury balance: 4,765.12 BTC at bc1pdwu79dady576y3fupmm82m3g7p2p9f6hgyeqy0tdg7ztxg7xrayqlkl8j9 (verified July 1, 2026 via blockchain.info and blockstream.info, 37,393 txs).
• Reserves (4,765.12 BTC) > circulating UBTC (3,272.76) — over-backed by ~1,492 BTC (~45.6%). 1:1 backing claim verified and improved.

Peg stability (30-day UBTC/BTC ratio per CoinGecko, through July 1, 2026):

• Current: 0.9997 (−0.03% below peg)
• 30-day min: 0.9946 (−0.54% below peg)
• 30-day max: 1.0132 (+1.32% above peg)
• 30-day avg: 0.9999
• Peg widened since prior assessment (±1.3% vs prior ±0.2%), likely reflecting broader BTC market volatility (BTC dropped ~19% in 30 days).

Incidents:

• No Unit/UBTC exploits found in DeFiLlama hacks database (cross-checked July 1, 2026) or Rekt News.
• Guardian offline incident (April 15, 2025): A Guardian went offline, causing delays in Bitcoin withdrawals and deposit address generation. This exposed fault tolerance gaps in the 2-of-3 Guardian Network. Community feedback called for permissionless Guardian participation to improve decentralization (source).
• No new incidents reported since prior assessment. ~16 months incident-free for UBTC token contract.

Funds Management

Accessibility

• Deposits: Permissionless — anyone can deposit BTC to receive UBTC.
• Withdrawals: Queue-based — withdrawal batches process every ~3 Bitcoin blocks for BTC, ~21 Ethereum slots for ETH.
• Current withdrawal queue (July 1, 2026, from Unit API): Bitcoin: 6, Ethereum: 1, all other chains (Avalanche, Base, Monad, Plasma, Solana, SPL, ZEC): 0. BTC queue length of 6 is elevated (prior assessment: 2) but within normal operating parameters (<10 threshold).
• Fees: No protocol fee; only native network gas fees.
• Minimum deposit: 0.0003 BTC.
• Revert mechanism: Failed deposits can be reverted after sufficient confirmations (20 blocks for BTC = ~3+ hours). Not all failed deposits are revertible.

Collateralization

UBTC is a 1:1 BTC-backed bridged asset. For every UBTC in circulation, the protocol claims to hold an equivalent amount of BTC in the Bitcoin treasury address.

• Bitcoin treasury: bc1pdwu79dady576y3fupmm82m3g7p2p9f6hgyeqy0tdg7ztxg7xrayqlkl8j9
• Reserves can be verified on any Bitcoin block explorer (e.g., mempool.space).
• No offchain collateral or lending activity is disclosed.
• Collateral is entirely native BTC — the highest quality collateral for a BTC wrapper.

Provability

• Bitcoin reserves are verifiable onchain via the Bitcoin treasury address.
• UBTC supply on HyperCore/HyperEVM is verifiable via totalSupply().
• The backing ratio requires comparing two chains (Bitcoin balance vs Hyperliquid UBTC supply), which complicates real-time verification but is deterministic.
• Bitcoin reserves are significantly over-collateralized — 4,765.12 BTC backs 3,272.76 UBTC (145.6% backing ratio). The treasury balance grew +1,403 BTC (+42%) since the prior assessment. While this provides a large safety buffer for UBTC holders, it also means the treasury holds 1,492 BTC (~$87.6M at current prices) beyond what is needed to back circulating UBTC. The reason for this excess is not publicly documented and could reflect in-flight deposits, protocol-held BTC, or other Unit obligations.
• No Chainlink Proof of Reserve (PoR) or equivalent third-party attestation mechanism is in place.
• Unit operates an explorer for transaction tracking.
• The protocol does not have a public dashboard showing real-time reserve status.

Liquidity Risk

HyperCore Spot Orderbook (Primary Liquidity)

UBTC trades on Hyperliquid's native spot CLOB (Central Limit Order Book). Per CoinGecko (July 1, 2026):

Venue	Pair	24h Volume
Hyperliquid	UBTC/USDC	~$27.8M
Hyperliquid	UBTC/USDH	~$2.3M

This is the primary exit liquidity for UBTC — the spot orderbook provides market-based exit at BTC spot prices.

HyperEVM DEX & Lending Liquidity

Per DeFiLlama yields API (July 1, 2026), 23 UBTC pools on Hyperliquid L1 with ~$25.5M total TVL (down from 28 pools, $43.7M). Top pools by TVL:

Protocol	Pool	TVL
HyperLend (pooled)	UBTC	$7,740,976
Project X	WHYPE-UBTC	$6,800,116
HyperSwap V3	WHYPE-UBTC	$1,714,058
Morpho Blue	UBTC	$1,668,860
Felix CDP	feUBTC	$1,668,710
Nest CL	WHYPE-UBTC	$1,662,041
Morpho Blue	UBTC	$1,432,202
Project X	UBTC-USDT0	$501,108
Project X	UBTC-UETH	$453,849
Project X	UBTC-USDC	$414,403
Others (13 pools, <$250K each)	—	$1,478,600

Morpho Markets (UBTC as Collateral)

14 Morpho markets use UBTC as collateral. Verified via Morpho Blue API (July 1, 2026):

• Total UBTC collateral supply (loan-asset-denominated): ~$2.29M (down from $4.14M)
• Total borrows against UBTC: ~$1.99M (down from $2.67M)

The specific market from the issue (UBTC-USDC):

Metric	Value
Market ID	0x45af9c72aa97978e143a646498c8922058b7c6f18b6f7b05d7316c8cf7ab942f
Loan Asset	USDC
LLTV	77.0%
Supply	~$645,846 (down from $836,542)
Borrow	~$582,421 (down from $697,892)
Utilization	90.2% (up from 83.4%)

Liquidity Assessment

• Primary exit: Hyperliquid spot CLOB with ~$30M daily UBTC volume — adequate for most position sizes.
• Secondary exit: Protocol withdrawal back to native BTC (queue-based, ~3 Bitcoin block batches). BTC withdrawal queue: 6 pending, ETH: 1 pending (July 1, 2026).
• Hyperliquid L1 DEX + lending TVL: ~$25.5M across 23 pools — notable decline from $43.7M (28 pools) in May 2026. Reduced liquidity breadth.
• All liquidity is within the Hyperliquid ecosystem — still no CEX listings.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

UBTC HyperEVM token contract:

• Owner: 0xB4FC973924a91362D301E583E839Cdaf4f19cdF8
• Onchain code-size: 0 — this is an EOA (Externally Owned Account). Re-verified July 1, 2026 (cast code returns 0x).
• Owner unchanged since deployment — only one OwnershipTransferred event ever emitted (from 0x0 at block 1,513,232, ts 1742779080 / Mar 24, 2025); no subsequent transfers. Re-verified July 1, 2026 via Etherscan V2 logs API.
• Per Unit docs: The HyperEVM deployer is "controlled via multi-party computation (MPC), requiring key-shares from multiple signers to construct and perform transactions." However, this is not verifiable onchain — it appears as a regular EOA.
• Contract type: UUPS upgradeable proxy — the owner can upgrade the implementation without timelock.
• Implementation unchanged: only one Upgraded event ever emitted (at deployment). Current implementation slot still points to 0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc (verified July 1, 2026 via cast storage). Bytecode size (11,660 bytes) and selector list (22 selectors) also unchanged.
• No timelock detected onchain.
• No multisig onchain — the MPC claim is offchain only.

Guardian Network (bridge operations):

• 2-of-3 MPC threshold signature scheme.
• 3 Guardians: Unit, Hyperliquid, and Infinite Field.
  • Infinite Field self-identifies as "a proprietary HFT market making firm" running on Hyperliquid since February 2024 (source).
• Each Guardian runs independent blockchain indexers, verifiers, and secure enclaves (e.g., AWS Nitro).
• Guardian keys are generated via distributed key generation (DKG), encrypted at rest via KMS, combined only at runtime in secure enclaves.
• The relay server only forwards ciphertext — no key material.
• Leader centralization: Currently a single pre-determined leader coordinates proposals. The protocol plans to implement a leader election process in the future, but this creates interim centralization risk.

Key concern: While the bridge operations use 2-of-3 MPC, the HyperEVM token contract ownership is an EOA. A compromise of the MPC key (or the offchain signers controlling it) could allow an attacker to upgrade the UBTC implementation to a malicious contract.

Programmability

• The UBTC token contract is an OZ ERC20Upgradeable + OwnableUpgradeable + UUPSUpgradeable, with two non-OZ additions confirmed from selectors and bytecode strings:
  1. USDT-style sender blacklist — functions addToBlacklist(address), removeFromBlacklist(address), isBlacklisted(address) are present, and the bytecode contains the revert string "UBTC: sender blacklisted". The blacklist is enforced inside the transfer path → a blacklisted holder cannot move their UBTC. This implies freeze risk for any HyperEVM holder, including Morpho borrowers (a frozen position cannot be liquidated normally).
  2. Compliance-authority role separate from owner() — complianceAuthority() returns the address authorized to manage the blacklist; revert strings include "UBTC: caller is not compliance authority" and "UBTC: new compliance authority cannot be zero". Currently the compliance authority equals the owner EOA 0xB4FC973924a91362D301E583E839Cdaf4f19cdF8. There is a setter (selector 0x6b9be885, signature unrecovered, almost certainly updateComplianceAuthority(address)).
• No mint(address,uint256) (0x40c10f19) or burn selector is present on the EVM implementation. Supply changes happen on the HyperCore side under HIP-1 native token semantics; totalSupply() is the fixed 21M Bitcoin cap and tokens move into HyperEVM via the HyperCore↔HyperEVM bridge. The constant coreDeployer (selector 0xb768259d) is hardcoded to 0xF036a5261406a394bd63Eb4dF49C464634a66155.
• No paused(), cap(), MINTER_ROLE(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE(), or DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() functions exposed.
• The bridge operations (deposit/withdrawal) are handled entirely offchain by the Guardian Network — the onchain HyperEVM contract is the ERC-20 reflection plus the freeze/compliance surface above.
• The deterministic state machine underlying all protocol actions guarantees strict, verifiable workflows per the security docs.

External Dependencies

Critical dependencies:

1. Bitcoin network — for BTC custody and transfer verification.
2. Hyperliquid L1 — HyperCore consensus/liveness and HyperEVM execution.
3. Guardian Network infrastructure — AWS Nitro enclaves, relay servers, indexers.
4. KMS services — for Guardian key encryption at rest.

Hyperliquid chain risk:

• Hyperliquid is a highly centralized chain — Hyper Foundation controls 56.4% of validator stake via 5 validators, exceeding the 1/3 BFT blocking minority (per kHYPE assessment).
• HyperEVM shares the same HyperBFT consensus as HyperCore — no separate bridge risk between the two, but full L1 dependency.

Operational Risk

• Team: Unit describes itself as "a research and development collective dedicated to advancing the Hyperliquid ecosystem." Core team members claim expertise from HRT (Hudson River Trading), Jump (Jump Crypto), Fortress, and IDF cyber units (per docs). The team is reportedly self-funded.
• Team transparency: No individual team members are named or publicly doxxed. No "Team" page with identifiable individuals. Multiple third-party analyses (ChainCatcher, Impossible Finance) note "founders and investors are unknown" and flag this as a transparency concern.
• Entity: "Unit Labs" — referenced in regulatory compliance docs.
• Legal: Unit Labs utilizes blockchain analytics to screen wallets (OFAC SDN List compliance). Frontend implements IP-based geofencing for prohibited jurisdictions. Legal inquiries to legal@hyperunit.xyz.
• Twitter: @hyperunit (primary, per CoinGecko) / @unitxyz (per DeFiLlama).
• Token: The team secured the $UNIT ticker for ~$350K in January 2025, strongly suggesting plans for a future token launch. No official airdrop confirmed.
• Documentation: Adequate — hosted on GitBook, covers architecture, security, API, key addresses. Some pages are JS-rendered only.
• Compliance: Guardians independently implement compliance screening. Unit Labs uses blockchain analytics software. Maintains transaction records for law enforcement disclosure.
• Incident handling: Guardian offline incident (April 15, 2025) was resolved, but no formal public incident response plan is documented.

Monitoring

Key addresses and data to monitor:

1. Bitcoin Treasury Monitoring (MANDATORY)

• Bitcoin treasury: bc1pdwu79dady576y3fupmm82m3g7p2p9f6hgyeqy0tdg7ztxg7xrayqlkl8j9
• Compare BTC held vs UBTC circulating supply on Hyperliquid
• Alert: If BTC balance falls below circulating UBTC supply

2. Token Supply Monitoring (MANDATORY)

• UBTC.totalSupply() on HyperEVM: 0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463
• HyperCore token supply via Hyperliquid explorer
• Alert: Sudden supply changes >10% in 24h

3. Contract Upgrade Monitoring (MANDATORY)

• Monitor Upgraded events on UBTC proxy contract
• Monitor ownership transfers on UBTC contract (OwnershipTransferred event)
• Alert: Any implementation upgrade or ownership change (immediate)

4. Peg Monitoring

• UBTC/BTC price ratio (CoinGecko, Hyperliquid spot)
• Alert: Discount >3% sustained for >1h

5. Withdrawal Queue Monitoring

• Unit API endpoint: GET https://api.hyperunit.xyz/withdrawal-queue
• Alert: Bitcoin withdrawal queue >10 pending operations

6. Guardian Network Health

• Monitor for any Guardian downtime or signing failures
• TODO: No public endpoint for Guardian health status identified. Confirmed July 1, 2026: Unit API (api.hyperunit.xyz) only publicly exposes withdrawal-queue and explorer endpoints; all other attempted endpoints (status, health, guardians, reserves, stats, config) return HTTP 200 with empty bodies. No third-party Guardian monitoring service identified.

Overall Risk Score: 5.0 / 5.0

Risk Tier: HIGH RISK

Rationale:

• The critical gate "No audit" is still triggered. Unit Protocol has no publicly disclosed audits despite managing ~$418M in TVL (re-confirmed July 1, 2026).
• Implementation source code remains unverified on HyperEVMScan.
• No bug bounty program exists.
• HyperEVM contract owner is still an EOA (MPC claim not verifiable onchain) with UUPS upgradeability and no timelock; no ownership transfer or implementation upgrade since deployment.
• Without the critical gate, the weighted score would be 3.12/5.0 (Medium Risk), primarily elevated by the audit gap and centralization concerns.
• If audits are conducted and code is verified, the score could improve significantly to the Low-Medium range.

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess in 3 months or upon completion of an audit
• TVL-based: Reassess if TVL changes by more than 50%

1. Publication of any smart contract audit for Unit Protocol / UBTC
2. Source code verification on block explorers
3. Launch of a bug bounty program
4. Contract implementation upgrade on HyperEVM
5. Ownership transfer of the UBTC contract
6. Change in Guardian Network composition (addition/removal of Guardians)
7. Introduction of timelock governance (positive trigger — would improve score)

Appendix: What Would Improve the Score

If the following were addressed, the score could improve from 5.0 to approximately 2.5-3.0 (Low-Medium Risk):

1. Audit by 1-2 reputable firms → Would remove critical gate trigger
2. Implementation source code verification on HyperEVMScan → Would improve transparency (proxy is already verified)
3. Bug bounty program → Would reduce audit category score
4. Onchain multisig for contract ownership (replacing EOA) → Would improve governance score
5. Timelock on contract upgrades → Would improve governance score

Appendix: Implementation Surface (bytecode-derived)

Source not verified — the function set below was reconstructed from the deployed bytecode and re-verified on July 1, 2026. This is the baseline to diff against on the next reassessment. Any new selector, removed selector, or changed bytecode size means a hidden upgrade or unrecorded behavior change.

Implementation: 0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc — bytecode size 11,660 bytes (unchanged from May 2026). Selector count: 22 (unchanged).

Standard OZ surface (callable through the proxy):

Selector	Signature	Source
0x06fdde03	name()	OZ ERC20
0x95d89b41	symbol()	OZ ERC20
0x313ce567	decimals()	OZ ERC20
0x18160ddd	totalSupply()	OZ ERC20
0x70a08231	balanceOf(address)	OZ ERC20
0xa9059cbb	transfer(address,uint256)	OZ ERC20
0x23b872dd	transferFrom(address,address,uint256)	OZ ERC20
0x095ea7b3	approve(address,uint256)	OZ ERC20
0xdd62ed3e	allowance(address,address)	OZ ERC20
0x8da5cb5b	owner()	OZ Ownable
0xf2fde38b	transferOwnership(address)	OZ Ownable
0x715018a6	renounceOwnership()	OZ Ownable
0x4f1ef286	upgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)	OZ UUPS v5
0x52d1902d	proxiableUUID()	OZ UUPS
0xad3cb1cc	UPGRADE_INTERFACE_VERSION()	OZ UUPS v5
0x8129fc1c	initialize()	OZ Initializable

Custom (non-OZ) surface — the part that warrants audit:

Selector	Signature	Notes
0x44337ea1	addToBlacklist(address)	resolved via 4byte directory
0x537df3b6	removeFromBlacklist(address)	resolved via 4byte directory
0xfe575a87	isBlacklisted(address)	resolved via 4byte directory; isBlacklisted(0x0)=false, isBlacklisted(owner)=false, isBlacklisted(HyperCoreTreasury)=false as of 2026-07-01
0x309f477a	complianceAuthority()	resolved via OpenChain DB; returns 0xB4FC973924a91362D301E583E839Cdaf4f19cdF8 (= current owner())
0x6b9be885	unknown setter (address), nonpayable	not in 4byte/OpenChain; reverts when called from a non-authority; inferred as updateComplianceAuthority(address)
0xb768259d	unknown pure getter	not in 4byte/OpenChain; returns the constant 0xF036a5261406a394bd63Eb4dF49C464634a66155 (the HyperCore deployer multi-sig); inferred as coreDeployer()

Notably absent selectors: no mint(address,uint256) (0x40c10f19), no burn(uint256)/burnFrom(address,uint256), no pause()/unpause(). Supply changes occur on the HyperCore side; the HyperEVM contract has no mint/burn entrypoint of its own.

Bytecode strings observed (printable ASCII runs ≥ 6 chars, after stripping push-data noise):

• "Unit Bitcoin"
• "UBTC: sender blacklisted" — proves the blacklist is enforced inside the transfer path (sender side, not just metadata).
• "UBTC: caller is not compliance authority" — proves a distinct compliance-authority role exists at the modifier level.
• "UBTC: new compliance authority cannot be zero" — proves the authority is transferable via a setter with a zero-address check.

Risk implications of the custom surface:

1. The owner / compliance authority can freeze any HyperEVM UBTC holder's balance. Downstream protocols (Morpho UBTC-USDC etc.) inherit this risk: a frozen borrower's position cannot be liquidated through normal transfer.
2. The complianceAuthority role is currently the same EOA as owner (0xB4FC97…cdF8), which is claimed-MPC but onchain just an EOA. Compromise of that key gives both upgrade rights AND freeze rights.
3. We cannot confirm from bytecode whether the blacklist's transfer-block exempts approved bridge addresses, whether there is a destroyBlackFunds-style siphon, or what happens to allowances when an address is blacklisted. These require source verification or audit to answer.

Reproduction commands (rerun on next reassessment and diff):

# bytecode + size
cast code 0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc \
  --rpc-url https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm | wc -c   # expect 23323 (= 11,660 bytes + "0x" + newline)

# selectors
cast code 0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc \
  --rpc-url https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm | xargs cast selectors

# privileged role state
cast call 0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463 "owner()(address)" \
  --rpc-url https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm
cast call 0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463 "complianceAuthority()(address)" \
  --rpc-url https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm
cast call 0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463 0xb768259d \
  --rpc-url https://rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm   # coreDeployer constant

# verify source-verification status (chainId 999 = HyperEVM)
curl -s "https://api.etherscan.io/v2/api?chainid=999&module=contract&action=getsourcecode&address=0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc&apikey=$ETHERSCAN_API_KEY"

Checklist for the next reassessment:

• Bytecode size still 11,660 bytes? → ✅ Confirmed July 1, 2026.
• Same 22 selectors? → ✅ Confirmed July 1, 2026.
• Implementation source code verified on HyperEVMScan? → ❌ STILL NOT VERIFIED as of July 1, 2026.
• complianceAuthority still equals owner? → ✅ Yes, both 0xB4FC97…cdF8.
• Any address showing isBlacklisted(addr)=true? → ✅ None found (checked owner, zero addr, HyperCore treasury).
• Any new Upgraded event on the proxy? → ✅ None beyond deployment (verified via Etherscan V2 logs API).

Sources

• Unit docs: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/
• Unit app: https://hyperunit.xyz/
• Unit explorer: https://explorer.hyperunit.xyz
• Unit architecture: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/architecture/components
• Unit security: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/architecture/security
• Unit key addresses: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/developers/key-addresses/mainnet
• Unit token metadata: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/developers/key-addresses/mainnet/token-metadata
• Unit team: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/unit/about-unit/team
• Unit regulatory compliance: https://docs.hyperunit.xyz/legal/regulatory-compliance
• Unit withdrawal queue API: https://api.hyperunit.xyz/withdrawal-queue
• DeFiLlama Unit: https://defillama.com/protocol/unit
• CoinGecko UBTC: https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/unit-bitcoin
• Morpho UBTC markets: https://app.morpho.org/hyperevm/market/0x45af9c72aa97978e143a646498c8922058b7c6f18b6f7b05d7316c8cf7ab942f
• HyperEVMScan UBTC proxy (verified): https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0x9FDBdA0A5e284c32744D2f17Ee5c74B284993463#code
• HyperEVMScan UBTC implementation (unverified): https://hyperevmscan.io/address/0x1a7689c3b783eb37550efbb9c81e7f468f7034fc
• Onchain verification via cast against HyperEVM RPC (rpc.hyperliquid.xyz/evm)
• Morpho Blue API: https://blue-api.morpho.org/graphql
• DeFiLlama Yields API: https://yields.llama.fi/pools
• DeFiLlama Hacks: https://api.llama.fi/hacks
• Infinite Field Guardian announcement: https://x.com/infinitefieldx/status/1890437991224520799
• ASXN Unit Protocol analysis: https://newsletter.asxn.xyz/p/unit-protocol
• Impossible Finance HyperUnit analysis: https://blog.impossible.finance/hyperunit-cross-chain-asset-infrastructure-for-hyperliquid/
• blocmates Unit overview: https://www.blocmates.com/articles/unit-the-asset-tokenization-layer-on-hyperliquid
• ChainCatcher Unit analysis: https://www.chaincatcher.com/en/article/2168910
• Delphi Digital HyperUnit analysis: https://members.delphidigital.io/feed/hyperunit-the-infrastructure-powering-native-spot-on-hyperliquid